BOSTON,  HARTFORD,  AND  ERIE  RAILROAD. 


TESTIMONY 


J.  W.  BROOKS 


BEFORE  THE 


COMMITTEES  ON  RAILROADS, 

OF  THE 


LEGISLATURE  OF  MASSACHUSETTS, 


March.  29th,  1870. 


WITH  AN  APPENDIX. 


BOSTON : 

ROCKWELL  & CHURCHILL,  PRINTERS, 
122  Washington  Street. 

1 8 70. 


5^5,4- 


INTRODUCTION. 


Since  my  testimony  in  relation  to  the  Boston,  Hart- 
ford, and  Erie  Railroad  was  given  at  the  State  House, 
the  other  day,  some  new  points  have  occurred  to  me, 
which  are  discussed  in  the  appendix  following  the 
paper  read  before  the  committees. 

The  friends  of  the  Boston,  Hartford,  and  Erie  Railroad 
have  proclaimed  that  in  my  evidence  I spoke  for  sev- 
enty-five to  one  hundred  millions  of  capital  that  was 
arrayed  against  this  enterprise ; that  I was  connected 
with  Western  railroads,  and  did  not  speak  from  an  im- 
partial stand-point.  I speak  for  no  man  but  myself;  my 
friends  had  not  seen  the  paper  I read  at  the  State 
House,  nor  were  acquainted  with  my  views,  save  by  the 
reasonable  conjecture,  that  my  natural  instincts  would 
scarcely  harmonize  with  the  management  of  the  Boston, 
Hartford,  and  Erie  Railroad. 

The  gentlemen  with  whom  I have  had  the  honor  to 
act  for  nearly  thirty  years  have  built,  and  now  con- 
trol and  manage,  once  and  a half  as  many  railroads  as 
there  are  in  Massachusetts.  These  lines  chiefly  con- 
verge at  Chicago,  from  where  they  gradually  spread  out 
westward,  until,  at  the  Missouri  River,  they  extend  from 
the  Union  Pacific  Railroad  on  the  north  to  the  Indian 
Territory  on  the  south,  presenting  a front  three  hun- 


4 


dred  and  fifty  miles  broad,  in  the  latitude  of  the  great 
bend  of  the  Missouri  River.  We  have  brought  our  lines 
to  a common  point  at  Chicago,  because  there  the  lines 
for  Philadelphia,  New  York,  and  Boston  start  for  the 
seaboard.  We  may  have  been  influenced  to  select  that 
point  as  an  outlet  for  our  lines,  because  it  was  on  this 
parallel  of  latitude;  our  judgment  may  have  been  influ- 
enced by  a tincture  of  New  England  feeling,  — of 
Massachusetts  feeling,  and,  if  you  please,  of  Boston  feel- 
ing, and  thus  far  my  stand-point  may  be  a partial  one, 
— but  our  position  at  Chicago  is  one  of  unqualified  in- 
dependence, and  it  is  a matter  of  pecuniary  indifference 
to  us,  whether  the  business  we  have  gathered  from  five 
States  finally  reaches  the  sea  at  Boston,  New  York,  or 
Philadelphia. 

It  needs  no  argument  to  show  that  it  is  for  our  inter- 
est to  have  as  many  practicable  routes  to  reach  the  sea- 
board as  possible,  and  if  we  thought  the  Boston,  Hart- 
ford, and  Erie  Railroad  could  ever  reduce  the  rates  of 
freight,  either  by  carrying  it  itself,  or  creating  addi- 
tional competition  with  others,  I should  have  a direct  in- 
terest in  having  it  completed. 


5 


BOSTON,  HARTFORD,  AND  ERIE  RAIL- 
ROAD. 

[Paper  read  by  Mr.  Brooks  before  the  Committees.'] 

In  order  to  form  an  intelligent  and  well-grounded 
opinion,  upon  the  merits  of  this  undertaking,  I have 
divided  it  into  as  many  portions,  or  branches,  as  are 
sufficiently  distinct  from  each  other  to  require  a sep- 
arate treatment,  and  given  to  each  that  consideration 
which  its  importance  seemed  to  require. 

I shall  give  the  reasons  upon  which  my  opinions  are 
founded,  that  no  more  or  less  weight  may  be  given  to 
those  opinions  than  the  reasons  shall  justify:  — 

GRADES  UPON  THE  BOSTON,  HARTFORD,  AND  ERIE 

COMPARED  WITH  THOSE  UPON  THE  BOSTON  AND 

ALBANY  RAILROAD. 

It  is  claimed  that  a locomotive  can  haul  twenty-five 
per  cent,  more  freight  over  the  Boston,  Hartford,  and 
Erie  than  over  the  Boston  and  Albany  Railroad.  This 
is  neither  true  of  the  ruling  grades  which  are  eastward 
in  the  direction  of  the  heavy  tonnage,  nor  a fair  method 
of  stating  it.  The  Boston  and  Albany  Railroad  is,  and 
always  has  been,  worked  in  four  divisions,  ending 
respectively  at  Worcester,  Springfield,  Pittsfield,  and 
Albany.  This  arrangement  separates  the  light  from 
the  heavy  grades,  in  working  the  line,  and  enables 


6 


them,  by  using  more  locomotives  upon  the  heavy  grades 
and  less  upon  the  light  ones,  to  work  all  their  power 
upon  maximum  loads,  and  thus  with  the  greatest  econ- 
omy. The  ruling  grades  coming  east  on  the  first 
division  of  the  Boston  and  Albany  Railroad  are  thirty 
feet  per  mile;  on  the  second  division,  sixty  feet  per 
mile;  on  the  third  division,  seventy-five  and  one-half 
feet  per  mile;  and  on  the  fourth  division,  forty-five  feet 
per  mile.  This  gives  an  average  of  fifty-two  and  six- 
tenths  feet  per  mile  for  the  ruling  grades  on  the  four 
divisions.  If  the  sixty  feet  grades  of  the  Boston,  Hart- 
ford, and  Erie  Railroad  are,  as  I have  understood,  so  scat- 
tered as  to  bring  them  on  every  working  division,  then 
the  average  ruling  grades  on  the  Boston  and  Albany 
Railroad  are  about  fourteen  per  cent,  lower  than  on  the 
Boston,  Hartford,  and  Erie;  and,  making  the  ordinary 
allowance  for  friction,  — say,  seven  and  one-half  pounds 
per  ton,  or  equal  to  a grade  of  twenty  feet  per  mile,  — it 
will  be  found  that  a little  over  ten  per  cent,  more  power 
is  required  to  move  a given  amount  of  traffic  on  the  Bos- 
ton, Hartford,  and  Erie  than  on  the  Boston  and  Albany 
Railroad.  The  practical  difference  is,  however,  much 
more  than  ten  per  cent,  in  favor  of  the  Boston  and 
Albany  Railroad,  for  their  heavy  grades  are  so  located 
that,  by  the  use  of  assistant  locomotives  in  two  or  three 
places,  their  average  load  is  very  much  increased; 
whereas  they  have  so  many  sixty-feet  grades  on  the 
Boston,  Hartford,  and  Erie  Railroad,  and  so  large  a 
proportion  of  their  whole  line  has  grades  of  fifty  feet 
and  upwards,  that  this  expedient  cannot  be  economi- 
cally resorted  to. 


7 


THROUGH  BUSINESS. 

For  half  a generation  the  New  York  Central  and 
Hudson  River  Railroads  have  been  carrying  freight 
between  the  "West  and  New  York,  through  the  Mo- 
hawk and  North  River  Valleys,  and  making  colossal 
fortunes  in  the  business;  adding  immensely  to  their 
facilities  and  power  for  moving  freight;  besides  making 
regular  and  extra  dividends  out  of  the  profits  of  their 
traffic. 

The  Erie  Railroad  through  all  these  years  has  been 
vainly  endeavoring  to  make  a profit  by  carrying  freight 
at  the  same  rate  over  the  mountains  of  Southern  New 
York. 

It  is  not  likely  that  they  ever  made  a dollar  on  their 
long  traffic. 

Nothing,  of  course,  can  be  learned  from  the  reports 
and  figures  of  people  who  have  so  much  to  conceal; 
but  the  large  increase  of  their  capital  and  debt,  which 
has  been  constant  throughout  their  history,  and  appar- 
ently out  of  all  proportion  to  the  increase  of  their  prop- 
erty, would  indicate  that  the  profits  on  their  local 
business  had  been  all  swallowed  up  by  the  losses  on 
their  through  traffic. 

The  cost  of  working  traffic  over  the  Erie  road  is 
necessarily  very  high;  while  over  the  New  York  Cen- 
tral it  is  very  low.  One  is  a broad-gauge  mountain 
road,  and  the  other  an  ordinary  gauge,  — nearly  a level 
one. 

The  advocates  of  the  broad-gauge  theory  of  late 
years  have  been  pretty  much  confined  to  its  unfortunate 
victims.  The  extra  weight  of  its  rolling  stock  in  pro- 


8 


portion  to  the  load  carried,  raises  the  proportion  of  non- 
paying tonnage;  and  the  friction  due  to  the  curves  is 
largely  in  excess  of  that  upon  the  narrow  gauge. 

In  some  foreign  countries,  where  such  property  is 
protected  from  competition,  the  broad-gauge  roads  are 
prosperous;  but  where  they  come  in  open  competition 
with  the  narrow  gauge,  bankruptcy  is  the  rule,  to  which 
there  is  hardly  an  exception.  Of  the  four  thousand 
miles  of  broad-gauge  roads  in  this  country,  I know  of 
but  one  line  that  is  not  hopelessly  bankrupt,  and  that 
makes  two  or  three  per  cent,  by  carrying  its  through 
freight  on  a narrow  gauge,  for  which  it  has  laid  down  a 
third  rail.  "Without  the  third  rail,  it  would  be  as  bank- 
rupt as  the  rest  of  them. 

The  distance  from  Fishkill  to  Buffalo,  the  nearest  point  on 
Lake  Erie,  and  where  most  of  the  freight  concentrates, 


is  by  the  Erie  Railroad,  389  miles. 

From  Fishkill  to  Boston  by  this  road,  224  “ 

Total  distance  from  Boston,  via  Fishkill  to  Buffalo,  613  miles. 

From  Boston  to  Albany  by  Boston  and  Albany 

Railroad,  200  miles. 

From  Albany  to  Buffalo  by  New  York  Central,  298  “ 

From  Boston  via  Albany  to  Buffalo,  — — 498  miles. 

Difference  in  favor  of  route  via  Albany,  115  “ 


I suppose  between  two  and  three  times  as  much 
freight  can  be  moved  with  the  same  power  on  the  New 
York  Central  as  on  the  Erie  road.  It  will  certainly  be 
within  the  mark  to  put  the  cost  of  conveying  freight  on 
the  Erie  road,  by  reason  of  its  mountain  grades,  broad 
gauge,  and  great  amount  of  curvature,  one-third  greater 
than  the  cost  to  the  New  York  Central.  If,  therefore, 


9 


we  add  one-third  of  three  hundred  and  eighty- nine  miles 
to  the  Erie  road,  we  shall  get  a comparison  that  will 
practically  differ  in  miles  only,  and  it  may  be  stated  as 
follows : — 


From  Boston  to  Fishkill, 

224  miles 

From  Fishkill  to  Buffalo, 

389  “ 

Add,  to  equalize  the  grades  with  the  other  route,  one- 

third  of  389,  say, 

130  “ 

Total  from  Boston  via  Fishkill  to  Buffalo, 

743  miles. 

From  Boston  to  Albany, 

200  miles. 

From  Albany  to  Buffalo, 

298  “ 498  “ 

Difference  in  favor  of  the  Albany  route, 

245  miles. 

Now,  as  I think  the  difference  in  cost  of  moving 
freight  on  the  Erie  and  on  the  New  York  Central  is 
much  more  than  one-third,  I think  the  practical  differ- 
ence is  much  greater  than  two  hundred  and  forty-five 
miles,  and  that  freight  can  be  moved  from  the  "West  by 
way  of  Albany  to  Boston  from  one  to  two  dollars 
per  ton  cheaper  than  from  the  West  to  Eishkill,  byway 
of  the  Erie  road. 

In  respect  to  the  cost  of  transporting  freight,  Eish- 
kill by  way  of  the  Erie  road  is  not  so  near  the  West  as 
Boston  is  by  the  way  of  the  Boston  and  Albany  road, 
and  the  construction  of  this  road,  even  if  it  could  be 
worked  for  nothing,  is  not  a step  forward  but  a step 
backward  from  the  West,  and  so  much  of  a step  back- 
ward, that  if  Boston  had  to  rely  upon  it  for  its  freight 
route  from  the  West,  it  would  place  the  city  about  as 
far  east  as  the  city  of  Bangor,  for  the  actual  cost  of 
carrying  freight  from  the  West  via  Albany  and  Boston 
to  Bangor  would  not  differ  materially  from  the  cost  of 


10 


taking  it  from  the  West  by  the  way  of  the  Erie  Kail- 
road  and  Fishkill,  to  Boston. 

I think  all  past  experience  confirms  this  view.  Most 
intelligent  men,  and  I venture  the  suggestion  that  all 
unprejudiced  ones,  who  have  had  much  experience  in 
the  management  of  the  internal  commerce  of  the  coun- 
try, will  agree  that  in  the  actual  cost  of  transit  between 
New  York  and  the  West  there  is  a very  large  difference 
against  the  Erie,  and  in  favor  of  the  New  York  Central 
route.  Albany,  therefore,  is  on  the  best  route  even 
between  New  York  and  the  West.  But  the  Boston, 
Hartford,  and  Erie  road,  instead  of  reaching  Fishkill 
with  less  miles  than  the  old  route  reaches  Albany,  is 
twenty-four  miles  longer  in  reaching  a point  eighty-five 
miles  south  of  Albany ; that  is,  eighty-five  miles  further 
from  the  West.  Together,  these  make  a loss  of  one- 
hundred  and  nine  miles,  and  still  they  have  before  them 
all  the  disadvantages  of  the  heavy  grades  of  the  Erie, 
which  we  have  before  stated  as  equal  to  one  hundred 
and  thirty  miles,  to  which  is  to  be  added  the  excess  of 
the  measured  distance  between  Fishkill  and  Buffalo  by 
the  Erie  road  over  the  route  via  Albany,  which  is  five 
miles,  giving  a total  of  two  hundred  and  forty-four 
more  miles,  considered  in  respect  to  cost  of  carrying 
freight,  besides  the  disadvantages  of  the  ferry,  tranship- 
ment and  broad  gauge.  By  far  the  best  route  for  the 
business  of  this  road  to  take  from  Fishkill  to  the  West 
is  via  Albany,  which  it  can  reach  with  a loss  in  actual 
distance  of  one  hundred  and  nine  miles,  as  compared 
with  the  Boston  and  Albany  road. 

This  is  clear  enough  from  the  simple  statement,  that 
it  is  absolutely  nearer  in  measured  miles  from  Fishkill 


11 


to  Buffalo  via  Albany,  than  via  the  Erie  road.  Taking 
this,  the  most  economical  route  from  Fislikill,  the  dis- 
tance to  Albany  is  more  than  fifty  per  cent,  above  the 
direct  route,  and  as  this  is  a much  larger  proportion 
than  the  profit  yielded  by  the  through  traffic,  they  can- 
not participate  in  it  unless  they  obtain  from  the  State, 
or  some  other  source,  an  annual  subsidy  to  make  up  the 
losses  they  will  incur  in  attempting  to  compete  for  it. 

Practically,  the  whole  cost  of  taking  freight  from  the 
West  to  New  York  has  been  incurred  in  getting  it  to 
Fishkill;  for,  in  addition  to  the  cost  of  bringing  it  to 
Newburgh,  on  the  west  side  of  the  Hudson,  the  expense 
of  the  ferry  and  the  transshipment  is  to  be  incurred, 
which  will  bring  the  cost  nearly  up  to  that  of  deliver- 
ing it  in  New  York  by  the  main  line  of  the  Erie  road. 

The  price  of  freight  from  the  West  to  New  York  is 
always  kept  down  by  the  competition  of  the  Baltimore 
and  Pennsylvania  lines  with  those  of  New  York.  All 
are  in  strong  competition  throughout  the  West,  for 
freight  to  that  city,  and  often  the  rates  get  down  very 
low.  Freights  in  the  general  average,  therefore,  are 
likely  to  be  lower  to  New  York  than  to  Fishkill,  where 
there  will  be  no  competition. 

New  York,  then,  is  a better  place  than  Fishkill  for 
Boston  to  go  to  get  freights  from  the  West,  and  there 
are  several  freight  routes  between  Boston  and  New 
York  on  which  the  actual  cost  will  be  much  less  than  by 
this  route  to  Fishkill. 

Perhaps  the  routes  of  competition  between  the  West 
and  New  York  require  some  explanation  to  be  well 
understood. 

Cleveland,  Chicago,  St.  Louis,  and  Cincinnati  are 


among  the  most  prominent  points  through  which  the 
freight  business  of  their  respective  districts  is  drained 
to  New  York. 

From  Cleveland  the  route  through  Pittsburgh  and 
the  Pennsylvania  Central  Railroad  is  twenty-two  miles 
shorter  to  New  York  city  than  the  shortest  route 
through  the  State  of  New  York;  from  Chicago  the 
route  via  Fort  Wayne  and  Pennsylvania  Central  is 
fifty-nine  miles  shorter;  from  St.  Louis  via  Indianapolis 
and  Pennsylvania  Central  is  seventy-four  miles  shorter; 
and  from  Cincinnati  the  route  via  Indianapolis,  Pitts- 
burg, and  Pennsylvania  Central  is  one  hundred  and 
seventeen  miles  shorter.  Thus,  nearly  the  whole  West 
can  reach  New  York  with  less  miles  of  carrying  via  the 
Pennsylvania  Central  than  over  either  the  New  York 
Central  or  Erie  Railroad.  This,  and  the  competition  of 
the  route  through  Baltimore,  which  is  part  water,  se- 
cures to  New  York  city  low  rates  of  freight  from  the 
West. 

The  routes  between  Boston  and  the  West  through 
Philadelphia  and  Baltimore  do  considerable  business, 
which  is  doubtless  capable  of  much  enlargement.  The 
position  of  these  cities  is  so  much  nearer  the  West  than 
any  of  the  more  northern  Atlantic  cities  that  their  land 
carriage  is  relatively  very  short.  A line  drawn  due 
south  from  Dunkirk,  the  western  terminus  of  the  Erie 
road,  and  four  hundred  and  sixty  miles  from  New  York, 
would  cross  the  Pennsylvania  Central  Railroad  three 
hundred  and  twenty-two  miles  from  Philadelphia,  and 
the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  two  hundred  and  thirty-four 
miles  from  Baltimore.  Thus  Philadelphia  is  shown  to 
be  one  hundred  and  thirty-eight  miles,  and  Baltimore 


13 


two  hundred  and  twenty-six  miles  nearer  to  the  West 
than  New  York.  This  gives  these  lines  great  power 
for  distributing  Western  produce  by  water  from  these 
outlets. 

In  competition  with  the  Boston  and  Albany  road,  we 
now  have  the  part  water  and  part  land  routes  to  New 
York,  connecting  with  the  various  lines  from  there:  the 
routes  through  Philadelphia,  and  that  through  Balti- 
more, and  the  Northern  Transportation  Company  via 
Ogdensburgh;  and  when  the  Hoosac  Tunnel  is  done 
we  shall  have  a route  both  shorter  in  miles  and  easier  in 
grade.  But  the  Boston,  Hartford,  and  Erie  Railroad 
will  never  form  part  of  a route  that  will  exercise  the 
least  influence  upon  the  carrying  trade  between  this 
city  and  the  West. 

BRIDGE  AT  EISHKILL. 

So  great  was  the  objection  to  interfering  with  the 
commerce  of  the  Hudson  River,  that  it  took  from  ten  to 
fifteen  years  to  get  a practicable  right  to  bridge  it,  even 
at  upper  Albany,  where  the  bridge  would  be  above 
nine-tenths  of  the  commerce.  And  it  was  only  when 
it  became  a necessity  to  the  city  of  New  York,  that 
freight  should  come  from  the  west  over  the  Hudson 
River  Railroad  to  that  city  without  transshipment,  that 
it  was  finally  accomplished. 

The  lower  part  of  the  river  is  more  crowded  with 
commerce  than  any  other  river  in  the  world  outside  of 
China.  It  is  often  so  crowded  that  steamers  have  to 
run  slow  and  pick  their  way  through  the  fleets  that 
nearly  fill  the  stream.  As  the  chief  object  of  a bridge 


14 


would  be  to  try  to  stop  freight  from  going  to  New 
York,  and  bring  it  to  Boston,  the  right  to  bridge  the 
river  could  hardly  be  procured,  even  if  there  was  but 
little  commerce  to  interfere  with.  It  may  be  regarded 
as  wholly  out  of  the  question ; but  if  a bridge  could  be 
got  there,  the  break  of  gauge  in  the  roads  would  still 
compel  a transshipment. 

[it  was  stated  afterwards  that  a charter  has  been 
granted  for  a high  bridge  across  the  Hudson,  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty  feet  above  the  water,  at  a point  some  ten 
miles  or  more  below  Fishkill.  These  observations  were 
intended  to  apply  to  a low  bridge.] 

COAL  TRAFFIC. 

Coal  comes  to  Philadelphia,  the  great  coal  depot  of 
this  country,  upon  a down  grade  from  the  mines,  over 
the  Reading  Railroad,  which,  with  its  three  hundred  lo- 
comotives and  ten  thousand  coal  cars,  is  better  prepared 
to  carry  it  cheap  than  any  other  railroad  in  the  world. 
They  bring  down  from  ten  to  twenty  thousand  tons  per 
day,  and  have  for  long  periods,  when  pressed  with  busi- 
ness, brought  more  than  twenty  thousand  tons  per  day 
on  an  average.  With  their  unexampled  facilities  and 
enormous  business,  the  actual  cost  to  them  of  carrying 
coal,  including  renewals,  is  about  ten  mills  per  ton  per 
mile.  It  is  not  at  all  likely  that  it  can  be  carried  upon 
the  Boston,  Hartford,  and  Erie  Railroad,  with  their 
heavy  grades,  and  running  one  way  empty,  for  less  than 
twenty  to  twenty-five  mills ; but  if  we  put  it  at  seven- 
teen mills  per  ton  per  mile  only,  the  actual  cost,  leaving 
nothing  for  the  use  of  rolling  stock,  or  profit  for  the 


15 


road,  will  be  three  dollars  and  eighty-one  cents  per  ton 
for  the  distance  from  Fishkill  to  Boston.  To  which 
must  be  added  the  cost  of  the  ferry  and  extra  handling 
and  loading  upon  cars  at  Fishkill,  say  nineteen  cents, 
and  we  have  four  dollars  per  ton  as  the  actual  cost  of 
delivering  the  coal  at  their  depot  in  Boston.  The  av- 
erage rates  for  transporting  coal  from  Philadelphia  to 
New  York,  last  year,  was  about  one  dollar  and  fifty- 
five  cents  per  ton.  It  can  probably  be  taken  in  barges 
and  scows  from  the  terminus  of  the  Erie  Railroad,  op- 
posite Fishkill,  to  New  York,  at  from  forty  to  fifty 
cents,  or  about  a dollar  a ton  cheaper  than  from  Phila- 
delphia. As  the  value  at  New  York  is  the  same,  it  fol- 
lows that  the  price  of  coal  at  Fishkill  is  about  a dollar 
a ton  higher  than  at  Philadelphia,  and  that  Boston  can- 
not afford  to  pay  so  high,  by  a dollar  a ton,  for  bringing 
coal  from  Fishkill,  as  from  Philadelphia. 

In  the  dull  season  of  the  year,  the  rate  from  Phila- 
delphia to  Boston  is  two  dollars  per  ton.  The  average 
rate  for  the  last  two  years  has  been  two  dollars  and 
fifty  cents  per  ton,  delivered  on  the  various  wharves 
where  wanted.  This  would  leave  but  a dollar,  or  a dol- 
lar and  a half,  which  Boston  could  pay  for  bringing 
coal  from  Fishkill,  without  having  it  cost  more  than  if 
brought,  as  now,  from  Philadelphia,  while  the  actual 
cost  to  bring  it  over  the  railroad  would  be  four  dollars 
per  ton.  The  price  of  bringing  coal  to  Philadelphia  is 
likely  to  be  materially  reduced,  by  the  use  of  large  iron 
screw  colliers.  The  first  of  a line  of  seven,  to  be  com- 
pleted in  May,  has  just  been  introduced  upon  the  route. 

I have  been  told  that  parties  in  the  interest  of  this  road 
had  stated  that  they  could  carry  coal  at  a cost  of  three- 


16 


fourths  of  a cent  per  ton  per  mile.  If  so,  this  is  not  the 
first,  or  the  tenth  time,  that  companies,  under  certain  cir- 
cumstances, have  put  out  remarkable  estimates.  But  I 
do  not  recollect  another  case  where  parties  have  claimed 
an  ability  to  transport  coal,  over  sixty-feet  grades, 
cheaper  than  other  men  of  the  most  enlarged  experi- 
ence, and  having  the  most  perfect  facilities,  could  carry 
it  down  hill.  I have  no  doubt  whatever  that  the  small 
portion  of  their  line  in  this  State  can  be  most  economi- 
cally supplied  with  coal  by  transporting  it  westward 
from  the  city  of  Boston;  and  that  the  country  in  the 
central  part  of  the  line  will  be  supplied,  as  heretofore, 
from  the  ports  on  Long  Island  Sound,  — leaving  only 
the  territory  along  their  line  in  the  western  part  of  Con- 
necticut, and  the  little  piece  in  the  State  of  New  York, 
which  can  be  supplied,  at  a fair  profit,  from  Fish- 
Mil. 

LOCAL  BUSINESS. 

It  is  claimed  that  because  this  railroad  crosses  many 
other  lines  between  Boston  and  Fishkill,  it  is  sure  to 
have  a large  local  business.  This  is  the  very  reason 
why  it  does  not  now,  and  never  can  have,  even  a fair 
local  traffic. 

The  first  railroad  that  is  built  through  a district  of 
country,  if  it  be  on  the  most  direct  route  to  the  nearest 
and  best  market,  will  permanently  command  the  carry- 
ing trade  of  the  country  it  accommodates.  Villages 
will  be  built,  and  manufactories  established  upon  it,  in 
the  combined  interest  of  the  people  along  its  line,  and 
the  capitalists  of  their  market  terminus.  The  whole  in- 
dustrial development  of  the  region  will  be  created  by, 


17 


under  the  control  of,  and  subservient  to  this  joint  inter- 
est. 

If  the  local  business  of  the  country  traversed  by  this 
road  was  with  Boston,  that  on  the  west  half  would  have 
an  average  haul  of  three-quarters  of  its  whole  length, 
and  that  on  the  east  half  an  average  haul  of  one- quar- 
ter of  its  whole  length,  and  the  local  traffic  of  the  west- 
ern half  would  then  be  worth  three  times  as  much  as 
that  of  the  eastern  half. 

The  business  of  the  country  along  the  west  half  of 
this  line  is  drained  to  New  York  by  some  seven  rail- 
roads, built,  controlled,  and  managed,  by  New  York. 
That  city  is  the  natural,  nearest,  and  best  market  for 
that  whole  region,  in  the  interest  of  which  it  has  been 
built  up  and  developed. 

This  road  will  get  some  very  short  local  business  on 
this  part  of  their  line,  by  taking  it  to  and  from  the  New 
York  lines  and  the  little  hamlets  upon  the  narrow  strips 
of  country  between  them.  The  large  towns  would  of 
course  be  mainly  upon  the  direct  lines  to  New  York, 
leaving  but  a scattered  population  between  them. 

The  effort  to  bring  the  business  of  this  region  to 
Boston  is  not  very  unlike  the  building  of  a railroad  from 
Portland  through  the  country  tributary  to  the  Boston 
and  Maine,  the  Lowell,  the  Fitchburg,  and  the  Worces- 
ter Railroads,  to  take  business  to  that  city.  The  coun- 
try traversed  is  filled  with  a wealthy  and  industrious 
manufacturing  population,  whose  business  is  large  and 
prosperous;  but  they  have  no  occasion  to  go  to  Port- 
land. Their  business  is  with  Boston,  a nearer,  larger 
and  better  market. 

On  the  eastern  half  of  the  line  the  population  and 
3 


18 


manufactories  have  clustered  about  and  grown  up  upon 
the  older  lines,  which  were  doubtless  laid  through  the 
locations  best  suited  by  their  natural  fitness  to  become 
centres  of  population  and  business.  It  is  not  reason- 
able, therefore,  to  look  for  a large  local  business  on  this 
part  of  their  line. 

A large  portion  of  this  railroad  is  by  no  means  new. 
It  has  been  running  many  years ; long  enough  to  test 
its  prospect  for  local  business,  and  to  see  if  the  char- 
acter of  it  is  likely  to  be  such  as  is  indicated  herein. 

Last  year  their  return  shows  the  distance  they  car- 
ried their  passengers,  through  and  way  included,  was 
an  average  of  less  than  eleven  miles  per  passenger,  for 
which  they  received  about  twenty-three  cents. 

Very  little  freight  is  moved  upon  railroads  as  short 
a distance  as  ten  miles.  The  cost  of  teaming  it  to  and 
from  the  depots,  for  these  short  routes,  makes  it  cheaper 
to  team  it  the  whole  way. 

The  average  distance  they  hauled  freight  last  year 
was  less  than  twenty-six  miles,  and  their  average  rate 
per  ton  about  one  dollar  and  forty-three  cents. 

At  these  rates  it  would  take  five  millions  of  passen- 
gers, and  one  million  tons  of  freight,  if  they  made  a 
profit  of  one-third  of  their  gross  earnings  (which  could 
hardly  be  done  on  that  class  of  traffic)  to  pay  a net  of 
seven  per  cent,  on  the  money  they  spent  last  year. 

NEW  YORK  AND  BOSTON  PASSENGER  BUSINESS. 

A part  of  this  line  is  capable  of  being  made  a com- 
petitor for  a portion  of  the  passenger  business  between 
Boston  and  ]STew  York.  It  is  said  to  be  seven  miles 
shorter  from  Boston  to  Hartford  than  the  route  via 


19 


Springfield.  I do  not  think  that  this  is  more  than  dif- 
ference enough  to  compensate  for  the  great  advantages 
of  the  double  track,  and  high  character  of  the  route 
via  Springfield.  With  a difference  of  only  seven  miles, 
the  other  line,  with  the  same  skill  and  effort,  would  be 
likely  to  make  quite  as  good,  and  perhaps  better,  aver- 
age time.  The  New  York  Central  route  is  twenty-two 
miles  longer  than  the  Erie  route,  for  all  the  travel  which 
passes  through  Cleveland  between  New  York  and  the 
West;  and  yet  it  probably  carries  more  than  three- 
quarters  of  the  travel,  and  makes  much  the  best  aver- 
age time.  I do  not  refer  to  this  in  disparagement  of 
this  line,  but  simply  to  show  that  something  more  is 
required  than  a route  seven,  or  even  twenty,  miles 
shorter  to  command  a fair  share  of  the  business.  No 
road  can  take  even  half  the  business  from  so  strong  a 
line  as  that  via  Springfield,  without  that  perfect  prepa- 
ration of  road  and  equipment,  which  is  not  to  be  pro- 
cured short  of  a vast  expenditure  of  money.  Whether 
for  a share  of  this  business,  already  divided  between  five 
lines,  it  would  pay  upon  the  required  expenditure,  is  a 
question  about  which  parties  might  differ  in  opinion. 
As  the  Boston  and  Albany  Railroad  must  run  several 
express  trains  between  Springfield  and  Boston  to 
accommodate  their  western  connections  and  Connect- 
icut River  valley  business,  they  can  carry  the  New 
York  travel  without  running  special  trains  for  it.  It 
might,  therefore,  be  profitable  to  them,  and  yet  a loss 
for  a line  differently  situated. 

The  amount  of  this  business  is  greatly  over-estimated 
by  the  public.  The  number  of  passengers  between 
Boston  and  New  York,  via  Springfield,  in  both  direc- 


20 


tions,  amounted,  in  1869,  to  less  than  ninety-one  thou- 
sand ; and  yielded  in  gross  receipts  less  than  two  thousand 
five  hundred  dollars  per  mile  of  road,  and  to  the  express 
trains,  about  a dollar  and  a quarter  per  mile  run,  — a 
sum  wholly  inadequate  to  pay,  except  in  combination 
with  other  business  of  a similar  express  character.  If 
the  whole  of  this  business  could  be  taken  to  the  new 
line,  it  would  not  pay  for  much  preparation  to  accom- 
modate it;  and  if  they  took  only  a portion,  which  is  the 
best  they  could  do,  it  would  certainly  not  be  a very 
promising  business  to  contend  for. 

COST  AOT>  DEBTS. 

The  mortgage  debt,  as  shown  by  the  experts,  of 
twenty-two  million  five  hundred  and  twenty  thousand 
six  hundred  dollars  upon  the  three  hundred  and  sixty- 
three  and  three-fourths  miles  of  their  road,  built  and 
proposed  to  be  built,  amounts  to  sixty-one  thousand 
nine  hundred  and  twelve  dollars  per  mile.  Their  float- 
ing debt,  as  stated  in  their  return,  amounts  to  seven 
million  three  hundred  and  forty-nine  thousand  one 
hundred  and  sixty-four  dollars.  From  this  should  be 
deducted  what  may  be  realized  upon  their  pledged  col- 
laterals, a sum  entirely  problematical,  say  two  million 
dollars,  leaving  a net  floating  debt  of  five  million  three 
hundred  and  forty-nine  thousand  one  hundred  and 
sixty-nine  dollars.  This  is  equal  to  fourteen  thousand 
seven  hundred  and  five  dollars  per  mile.  Their  whole 
debt,  funded  arid  floating,  not  including,  I suppose, 
unpaid  interest,  damages  for  non-payment  of  con- 
tractors, and  the  myriad  of  unsettled  accounts  and 


21 


claims  which  always  hang  over  so  extended  a concern 
in  its  financial  condition,  amounts  to  seventy-six  thou- 
sand six  hundred  and  eighteen  dollars  per  mile.  To 
pay  the  interest  on  its  debts  for  one  year,  and  get  rid 
of  all  legal  claims  against  the  property,  and  complete 
the  road  in  the  most  ordinary  manner,  and  equip  it  for 
a small  business,  would  doubtless  require  from  eight  to 
fourteen  millions  of  dollars,  and  would  bring  its  indebt- 
edness up  to  one  hundred  and  eight  thousand  dollars 
or  one  hundred  and  eighteen  thousand  dollars  per  mile. 

The  Hartford,  Providence,  and  Fishkill  Railroad,  one# 
hundred  and  twenty-two  miles  long,  and  a completed 
road,  was  purchased  by  this  Company  with  a debt  of 
about  two  millions  of  dollars  upon  it.  It  was  then 
worked,  I believe,  on  account  of  its  creditors,  and  being 
a bankrupt  concern,  I suppose  it  was  purchased  by 
assuming  its  debt,  and  paying  for  the  balance  of  the 
purchase  in  stock.  If  this  be  true,  then  the  whole  debt 
of  the  Company,  except  this  two  million  dollars,  was 
created  to  aid  in  the  construction  of  the  remaining  two 
hundred  and  forty-one  and  three-fourths  miles  of  the 
road,  on  which  it  will  amount  to  from  one  hundred  and 
forty-nine  thousand  dollars  to  one  hundred  and  sixty- 
five  thousand  dollars  per  mile. 

The  average  cost  of  all  the  other  railroads  in  Massa- 
chusetts, including  the  portions  beyond  the  State  line,  is 
about  forty-seven  thousand  dollars  per  mile.  The  lia- 
bilities of  this  Company,  exclusive  of  their  capital  stock, 
if  completed  in  the  most  ordinary  manner,  will  be  from 
thirty-six  million  to  forty-two  million  dollars,  which  is 
more  than  three-fifths  of  the  cost  of  all  the  rest  of  the 
railroads  of  the  Commonwealth,  including  their  vast 


22 


equipment  and  terminal  and  station  accommodations, 
and  some  three  hundred  miles  of  double  track.  At  the 
average  cost  per  mile  of  the  other  Massachusetts  rail- 
roads, this  one  would  cost  seventeen  million  one  hun- 
dred and  forty-seven  thousand  dollars;  whereas  its 
debts  alone  are  likely  to  exceed  forty  million  dollars. 

VALUE  OF  THE  RAILROAD. 

There  seems  to  be  great  difference  of  opinion  as  to 
the  value  of  this  road  when  completed.  The  State  En- 
gineer, I believe,  has  expressed  the  opinion  that  it  would  • 
more  than  pay  expenses  the  first  year,  but  is  not  san- 
guine that  it  would  pay  the  interest  on  five  million  dol- 
lars in  addition.  An  engineer  who  has  been  connected 
with  it  thinks  that  if  certain  further  large  expenditures 
are  made  it  will  pay  an  interest  of  seven  per  cent,  on 
forty  million  dollars. 

A railroad  that  cannot  pay  more  than  its  running 
expenses,  and  keep  up  its  property,  whatever  may  be 
the  market  price  of  its  securities,  is  worth  nothing  as 
property. 

As  the  main  branches  of  business  for  which  this  rail- 
road was  ostensibly  projected  cannot  be  done  by  it,  and 
most  of  its  remaining  expected  business  is  otherwise 
provided  for,  or  is  to  be  partially  procured  by  the 
closest  competition,  the  prospect  of  its  ever  being  of 
much  value  to  its  proprietors,  to  say  the  least,  is  remote 
and  uncertain. 

A railroad,  in  order  to  be  secure  of  yielding  any 
profit,  however  small,  should  have  sufficient  business 
which  it  can  call  legitimately  its  own ; that  is,  which  it 


23 


has  not  to  compete  with  other  lines  for,  to  more  than 
pay  its  working  expenses  and  renewals.  Thus  much 
being  secured,  the  amount  of  its  profits,  which  fixes  the 
value  of  the  property,  must  mainly  depend  upon  the 
further  supply  of  non-competing  business,  which  it  can 
count  on,  and  such  competing  traffic  as  it  has  advan- 
tages for  securing  and  conducting  fully  equal  to  those 
possessed  by  its  rival  lines.  Applying  these  principles 
to  test  the  merits  of  this  line,  we  find  that  their  relative 
disadvantages  for  conducting  a through  business  from 
the  West  are  greater  than  those  of  the  old  lines  by  more 
than  the  proportion  of  profit  in  the  business,  and  that 
therefore  they  cannot  participate  in  the  long  carrying 
trade  except  at  an  absolute  loss;  that  the  actual  cost  of 
bringing  coal  to  Boston  over  this  line  will  make  its  cost 
much  higher  than  if  the  city  is  supplied  by  the  old  route 
as' heretofore;  that  the  Boston  and  New  York  passen- 
ger business  is  so  moderate  in  amount  and  so  divided 
already,  and  the  preparation  required  to  compete  for  it 
is  so  considerable  and  expensive,  that  it  is  doubtful  if 
profit  enough  could  be  got  out  of  it  to  pay  fairly  upon 
the  outlay  required;  that  the  western  half  of  this  line 
runs  directly  across  the  natural  routes  of  its  carrying 
trade,  where  abundant  facilities  are  already  provided  to 
drain  the  business  to  its  nearest  and  best  market;  that 
years  of  development  have  shown  the  local  business  of 
the  eastern  half  of  the  line  to  be  exceedingly  small. 
Their  total  earnings  per  train  per  mile  were  less  last 
year  than  the  rest  of  the  Massachusetts  railroads  ex- 
pended per  train  per  mile  in  working  their  roads. 

'The  Hartford,  Providence,  and  Fishkill  Kailroad, 
forming  one-third  of  the  whole  road  of  this  Company, 


24 


has  been  rendered  bankrupt  by  a debt  of  less  than 
eighteen  thousand  dollars  per  mile.  It  may  at  present 
be  worth  more  than  that,  but  must  be  illy  able  to  carry 
one-half  or  even  one-third  of  the  average  debt  per  mile 
of  this  Company. 

They  have  two  roads  over  the  first  thirty-six  or 
thirty-eight  miles  of  their  line  from  Boston;  and  when 
the  Woonsocket  and  Putnam  line  is  done,  they  will 
have  two  roads  all  the  way  to  the  town  of  Putnam  or 
Mechanicsville,  about  sixty  miles,  to  which  there  is  still 
another  route,  though  eleven  miles  longer, w via  Worces- 
ter.” As  these  two  lines  join  each  other  in  the  cen- 
tre, and  at  both  ends,  they  must  be  very  crooked,  or  so 
near  each  other  that,  under  ordinary  circumstances, 
it  would  seem  as  if  the  country  to  be  drained  by  each 
was  much  too  narrow  to  furnish  a paying  business. 

Their  whole  prospective  business  is  so  cut  up  by  rival 
lines,  in  many  if  not  most  cases,  better  situated  to  accom- 
modate it,  that  I can  see  no  reliable  sources  from  which 
a business  likely  to  yield  any  profit  can  be  developed. 

It  would  be  very  marked  success  if  they  should  here- 
after make,  on  their  completed  road,  a profit  sufficient 
to  pay  the  interest  upon  half  as  much  per  mile  as  the 
average  cost  of  the  rest  of  the  railroads  in  Massachu- 
setts, which  would  be  represented  by  a capital  of  eight 
million  five  hundred  and  seventy  three  thousand  five 
hundred  dollars.  Paying  the  interest  on  this  sum  I 
should  regard  as  the  outside  measure  of  attainable 
profit,  while  the  chance  of  earning  more  than  enough  to 
pay  the  working  expenses  and  keep  up  the  property  is 
quite  uncertain. 


25 


CONCLUSION. 

A new  route  to  the  West,  to  command  public  confi- 
dence, should  be  at  least  as  good  as  any  already  exist- 
ing; and  to  entitle  it  to  public  assistance,  it  should  be 
manifestly  a better  one,  that  is,  one  upon  which  freight 
can  be  carried  at  less  cost  than  by  any  existing  route. 

The  break  of  gauge  and  want  of  a bridge  at  the 
North  Kiver,  compelling  a transshipment,  the  mountain 
grades  beyond,  or  the  more  than  a hundred  miles  of 
extra  length,  — either  of  these  three  inevitable  disad- 
vantages would  alone  be  sufficient  to  ruin  this  line  as  a 
route  from  the  West  to  Boston. 

Whatever  may  be  the  necessities  of  Massachusetts  or 
H aw  England  for  more  or  better  communication  with 
the  West,  this  railroad  can  be  of  no  use  in  relieving 
them. 

There  is  no  chance  of  its  being  able  to  bring  coal 
from  Fishkill  to  Boston,  or  to  any  part  of  Massachu- 
setts along  its  line.  It  will,  therefore,  have  no  influence 
upon  the  quantity  or  price  of  that  article  consumed  by 
our  citizens. 

The  local  business  of  the  eastern  half  of  the  line  is 
mainly  otherwise  accommodated,  as  evidenced  by  their 
insignificant  earnings  after  years  of  its  growth. 

The  business  of  the  country  traversed  by  the  west- 
ern half  of  it  is  with  the  city  of  New  York,  its  nearest 
and  best  market,  and  as  this  road  lies  across  its  natural 
routes,  it  cannot  participate,  to  any  extent,  in  the  carry- 
ing trade. 

This  line  opens  up  no  new  sources  of  business  to 

4 


26 


Boston  or  to  Massachusetts.  It  does  not  improve  its 
means  of  reaching  its  old  sources  of  business.  The 
very  small  portion  of  its  route  which  lies  within  this 
State  has  so  little  business  as  to  indicate  that  even  its 
importance  to  the  State,  as  a local  line,  is  very  insig- 
nificant. 

None  of  the  objects,  which  induced  the  public  to  aid 
in  the  construction  of  this  railroad,  can  be  attained  or 
even  promoted  by  it.  It  was  not,  therefore,  of  public 
interest  that  it  should  be  undertaken,  and  its  comple- 
tion will  have  no  favorable  influence  upon  the  city  of 
Boston,  or  State  of  Massachusetts. 


APPENDIX. 


BUSINESS  PROM  THE  PENNSYLVANIA  CENTRAL 
RAILROAD. 

It  did  not  then  occur  to  me,  when  preparing  the  fore- 
going paper,  that  this  road  would  claim  that  they  could 
get  business  from  the  Pennsylvania  Central  road,  a 
hundred  miles  south  of  hfew  York,  and  bring  it  past 
that  city,  over  their  road  to  Boston. 

Of  the  great  Centres  of  business  in  the  West,  by  far 
the  most  favorably  situated  for  sending  business  over 
this  route  is  Cincinnati.  From  that  city  the  distances 
on  the  present  and  proposed  routes  compare  with  those 
of  the  old  line,  as  follows : — 


PRESENT  ROUTES. 


From  Cincinnati,  via  Columbus  (Penn.  Central), 
Harrisburg,  and  the  shortest  route  to  New 
York,  is 


744  miles. 


From  Cincinnati  via  Columbus  and  Buffalo,  to 
Albany, is 


729  « 


Thus,  Cincinnati  is  nearer  to  Albany  than  to  New 
York,  by 


15  miles. 


28 


BY  THE  PROPOSED  MOUNTAIN  ROUTE. 

From  Cincinnati,  via  Columbus,  Pittsburg, 

and  Allentown,  to  Easton,  669  miles. 

From  Easton  by  the  proposed  new  line,  a 
large  part  of  which  is  yet  to  be  completed, 
it  is  said  by  the  friends  of  the  Boston, 

Hartford,  and  Erie  road  to  be,  94  “ 

From  Newburgh  to  Boston,  225  “ 

988  miles. 


BY  THE  OLD  LEVEL  ROUTE. 


Cincinnati  to  Cleveland,  248  miles. 

Cleveland  to  Buffalo,  183  “ 

Buffalo  to  Albany,  298  “ 

Albany  to  Boston,  200  “ 

929  miles. 

Extra  distance  over  the  mountains,  59  miles. 


Thus  the  mountain  route,  with  a large  amount  of  line 
yet  to  build,  will  be  fifty-nine  miles  longer  from  Cincin- 
nati to  Boston,  than  the  old  level  route  via  Buffalo. 
It  is  clear  that  after  the  many  millions  are  spent  to 
complete  this  new  route  beyond  Fishkill,  it  cannot 
bring  much  business  to  Boston  against  the  old  route. 

It  was  to  me  quite  a novel  claim  of  the  Boston,  Hart- 
ford, and  Erie  road  that  they  could  bring  produce  from 
Cincinnati,  via  the  Pennsylvania  Central  Railroad,  to 
Boston  for  export. 

Baltimore  is  more  than  two  hundred  miles,  and  Phil- 
adelphia more  than  one  hundred  miles,  nearer  the  West 
than  the  city  of  New  York.  This  favorable  position  of 


29 


these  cities  in  respect  to  the  produce  of  the  West  has 
given  them  a large  export  trade,  and  made  them  strong 
competitors  for  it;  especially  for  that  portion  of  it 
which  originates  south  of  Central  Ohio. 

Produce,  to  come  from  Cincinnati  or  any  part  of  the 
West,  via  the  Pennsylvania  Central  and  Boston,  Hart- 
ford, and  Erie  road  to  Boston,  passes  through  Harris- 
burg and  Easton  on  its  way  to  Fishldll.  At  Harrisburg 
it  is  only  eighty-five  miles  from  Baltimore,  and  one  hun- 
dred and  six  miles  from  Philadelphia,  while  it  is  four 
hundred  and  sixteen  miles  from  Boston,  — a difference 
of  three  hundred  and  thirty-one  miles  in  favor  of  Balti- 
more, and  three  hundred  and  ten  miles  in  favor  of 
Philadelphia.  This  difference,  at  two  cents  per  ton  per 
mile,  amounts  to  as  much  as  the  average  ocean  freight, 
so  that  produce  could  ordinarily  be  carried  as  cheap 
from  Harrisburg  via  Philadelphia,  or  Baltimore,  to 
Liverpool,  as  to  Boston. 

In  passing  Easton  the  produce  would  only  be  sev- 
enty-five miles  from  New  York,  while  it  would  be  three 
hundred  and  nineteen  miles  from  Boston,  — a difference 
of  two  hundred  and  thirty-four  miles  against  Boston, 
which,  at  two  cents  a ton  a mile,  would  make  four  dol- 
lars and  sixty-eight  cents  per  ton  against  the  latter  city. 

I will  make  no  comment  on  the  wisdom  of  spending 
millions  of  the  public  money  to  prepare  to  take  the 
produce  of  the  West  via  the  Pennsylvania  Central, 
and  Boston,  Hartford,  and  Erie  Railroad  to  Boston  foi 
export. 

ALBANY  AND  SUSQUEHANNA  CONNECTION. 

By  far  the  best  connection  between  Boston  and  the 
Erie  Railroad  is  over  the  Albany  and  Susquehanna 


30 


Railroad,  which  compares  with  the  Boston,  Hartford, 
and  Erie  route  as  follows:  — 

Buffalo  to  Fishkill,  389  miles 

Fishkill  to  Boston,  224  “ 

Buffalo  to  Boston,  via  Erie  road  and  Fishkill,  613  miles. 

Buffalo  to  Binghampton,  via  Erie  road,  208  miles 

Binghampton  to  Albany,  via  Albany  and  Sus- 
quehanna road,  142  “ 

Albany  to  Boston,  200  “ 550  “ 

Difference  against  Boston,  Hartford,  and 
Erie,  63  miles. 

Thus,  even  from  the  Erie  road  the  old  route  via 
Albany  is  sixty-three  miles  the  shortest. 

OTHER  ROUTES  TO  THE  NORTH  RIVER 

Parties  in  New  York  and  Connecticut  have  the 
charters  for,  and  have  commenced  a railroad  from 
New  Haven,  fifty-seven  miles,  to  the  North  River,  near 
Peekskill. 

Having  the  choice  of  bridge  sites,  they  approach  the 
river,  as  they  claim,  at  much  the  best  point  to  bridge  it, 
and  own  the  only  charter  for  a high  bridge  across  the 
Hudson,  which  is  estimated  to  cost  between  three  and 
four  millions  of  dollars. 

The  distance  to  the  North  River,  by  this  route,  com- 
pares with  the  Boston,  Hartford,  and  Erie  as  fol- 
lows : — 


31 


From  the  North  River  to  New  Haven,  57  miles. 

“ New  Haven  to  Willimantic,  50  u 

“ Willimantic  to  Boston,  86  “ 

Distance  from  Boston  to  North  River,  193  “ 

Boston  to  Fishkill,  via  B.  H.  & E.,  224  “ 

Saved  by  the  New  Haven  route,  14  1-3  per  cent.,  or  31  “ 


If  there  was  real  merit  in  any  of  these  lines,  for  Bos- 
ton business,  the  saving  of  fourteen  and  one-third  per 
cent,  is  shown  to  be  of  the  most  vital  importance  by  the 
fact  that  the  whole  profits  of  the  Erie  road  are  only 
eighteen  per  cent,  of  their  gross  earnings;  so  that  the 
new  line  could  make  quite  a profit  on  prices  which  the 
Boston,  Hartford,  and  Erie  would  make  a losing  busi- 
ness upon. 

As  this  line  strikes  the  river  some  twelve  or  fifteen 
miles  below  Fishkill,  a connection  between  it  and  the 
Pennsylvania  Central  would  be  much  shorter  than  a 
connection  to  Fishkill,  and  a saving  of  perhaps  forty 
miles  be  made  by  it  between  Boston  and  the  Pennsyl- 
vania Central  road.  If  this  saving  was  eighty  instead 
of  forty  miles,  I should  regard  it  of  little  interest  to 
Massachusetts,  for  the  line  would  still  be  far  more  ex- 
pensive to  freight  over  than  the  present  valley  route. 

With  this  line  completed  from  New  Haven  to  the 
river,  the  following  routes  connect  Boston  and  the  site 
of  the  proposed  high  bridge  over  the  Hudson:  — 

1.  From  Boston,  via  Providence,  New  London,  and 

New  Haven,  to  the  river,  213  miles. 

2.  From  Boston,  via  Springfield  and  New  Haven,  to 

the  river, 


219  « 


32 


3.  From  Boston,  via  Worcester,  Palmer,  Williman- 

tic,  and  New  Haven,  to  the  river,  225  miles. 

4.  From  Boston,  via  Willimantic  and  New  Haven, 

to  the  river,  193  u 

5.  From  Boston,  via  Worcester,  New  London,  and 

New  Haven,  to  the  river,  225  u 

The  Boston,  Hartford,  and  Erie  road  is  so  very 
crooked,  that,  as  shown  in  the  second  route  above,  you 
can  go  west  a hundred  miles  over  the  Albany  and  Bos- 
ton road  to  Springfield,  and  then  almost  due  south 
across  the  State  of  Connecticut,  sixty-two  miles,  to  New 
Haven,  and  then  go  west  and  reach  the  bridge  site,  with 
less  miles’  travel  than  via  the  Boston,  Hartford,  and 
Erie  road.  I suppose  the  Boston,  Hartford,  and  Erie 
road  could  not  be  extended  to  the  bridge  site  without 
making  it  ten  miles  longer  than  to  Fishkill,  or  two  hun- 
dred and  thirty-four  miles  from  Boston. 

All  of  these  routes  reach  the  bridge  site  with  less 
miles  than  the  Boston,  Hartford,  and  Erie,  and  one  of 
them  with  forty  miles  less. 

All  the  saving  in  distance  brings  the  coal  fields  so 
much  nearer  Boston,  and  though  it  will  not  enable  them 
to  bring  coal  to  this  city,  or  even  into  Massachusetts 
along  their  line,  they  can  of  course  bring  it  further 
eastward,  by  all  the  distance  saved. 

Four  of  these  shorter  routes  are  mainly  old  estab- 
lished lines,  with  more  or  less  double  .tracks,  and  other 
facilities  for  doing  a large  business.  Every  man,  con- 
versant with  railroad  traffic,  knows  that  an  old  estab- 
lished line  with  all  its  fixed  expenses,  like  taxes,  pay  of 
officers,  etc.,  and  including  the  decay  of  its  perishable 
property,  such  as  bridges,  ties,  etc.,  etc.,  provided  for 


33 


out  of  its  current  traffic,  can  take  upon  its  line  new 
business,  without  increasing  in  the  same  proportion  its 
expenses.  I have  found  these  fixed  expenses  on  some 
roads  to  be  one-third  of  the  whole;  on  some  others  it 
would  be  more,  and  on  some  less.  Whatever  the  pro- 
portion of  these  fixed  expenses,  it  is  obvious  that  just 
in  that  proportion  the  old  lines  can  work  cheaper  than 
the  new  line,  without  loss.  This  advantage,  and  in 
close  competition  it  is  a very  potent  one,  the  old  lines 
will  have  over  the  Boston,  Hartford,  and  Erie  road,  and 
in  that  degree  can  be  more  useful  public  servants. 

I have  simply  spoken  of  these  routes,  to  show  that 
there  are  other  parties  in  the  field,  whose  lines  are 
shorter  and  with  lower  grades,  and  already,  in  large  de- 
gree, prepared  to  do  the  traffic,  if  through  such  a route 
it  was  obtainable.  They  do  not  ask  for  State  aid,  but 
are  spending  their  own  money  in  their  own  work. 

Is  it  wise  for  the  State  of  Massachusetts  to  send 
any  more  of  its  money  down  into  the  States  of  Connec- 
ticut and  New  York,  to  make  war  upon  their  citizens 
by  further  aiding  a rival  enterprise?  Is  it  wise  for  the 
State  to  spend  its  money  in  building  a road  in  another 
State,  when  the  citizens  of  that  State  are  building  a 
road  that  will  serve  the  same  purpose?  Is  not  this  a 
somewhat  gratuitous  use  of  the  public  money? 

VALUE  OF  THE  RAILROAD. 

Some  of  the  people  connected  with  this  road  estimate 
that  it  will  earn,  when  extended  to  the  Hudson  River, 
seven  per  cent,  on  forty  million  dollars. 

The  Erie  Road,  with,  as  near  as  I can  ascertain 
from  its  time  tables,  about  eight  hundred  and  twenty- 
5 


34 


three  miles  of  line,  four  hundred  and  four  locomotives, 
three  hundred  and  thirty-eight  passenger,  baggage,  and 
mail  cars,  and  seven  thousand  four  hundred  and  forty- 
seven  freight  cars,  — an  equipment  which  cannot  now  be 
produced  for  eleven  million  dollars,  — does  not  earn  so  , 
much.  It  earns  about  seven  per  cent,  on  thirty-one 
million  dollars.  If  it  takes  eleven  million  dollars’  worth 
of  rolling  stock  to  earn  seven  per  cent,  on  thirty-one 
million  dollars,  it  will  take,  at  the  same  rate,  more  than 
fourteen  million  dollars’  worth  to  earn  the  interest  on 
forty  million  dollars.  In  short,  if  the  business  was 
offered  this  road,  in  order  to  earn  the  sum  stated,  it 
must  do  a third  more  business  on  its  three  hundred  and 
sixty-three  miles  of  road  than  the  Erie  does  on  over 
eight  hundred  miles,  which  would  require  fourteen 
million  dollars’  worth  of  rolling  stock,  a double 
track  all  the  way,  and  a third  track  much  of  the  way, 
and  such  terminal  and  other  facilities  as  have  not  been 
seen  in  this  or  any  other  country.  The  Erie  road,  with 
all  its  vast  preparation  and  double  track,  after  twenty 
years  of  development,  earns  a net  of  two  thousand  six 
hundred  and  forty-eight  dollars  per  mile.  At  this  rate, 
the  Boston,  Hartford,  and  Erie  would  earn  a net  of  nine 
hundred  and  sixty-one  thousand  tw’o  hundred  and 
twenty-four  dollars,  or  seven  per  cent,  on  thirteen  mil- 
lion seven  hundred  and  thirty-two  thousand  dollars. 

In  this  comparison,  it  will  be  seen  that  I have  given 
to  the  Boston,  Hartford,  and  Erie  the  same  proportion 
of  profit  on  the  business  that  is  realized  by  the  Erie 
road,  which  is  much  more  favorable  to  them  than  a just 
statement  of  the  case  warrants.  The  Eric  road  has  an 
enormous  local  business,  which  they  control,  and  of 


35 


course  get  a fair  profit  on.  It  is,  relatively,  a small 
carrier  of  produce  from  the  "West  to  the  seaboard. 
Their  whole  movement  of  produce,  through  and  way, 
including  the  supply  to  the  populous  non-producing 
region  they  traverse,  and  including  live  stock,  was  last 
year  less  than  one-seventh  of  their  whole  tonnage.  I do 
not  believe  their  through  produce  movement  amounts 
to  one-tenth  of  their  whole  tonnage.  I suppose  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  the  long  traffic  is  a losing  business 
to  the  Erie  road,  and  that  is  probably  the  reason  they 
do  so  small  a proportion  of  that  class  of  business.  One- 
half  the  tonnage  of  the  Hew  York  Central  is  produce. 
If  the  Erie  did  anything  like  that  proportion,  their  losses 
would  soon  render  them  unable  to  run  their  road  for  any 
kind  of  business.  How,  as  the  Boston,  Hartford,  and 
Erie  road  will  do  but  a small  local  business,  if  it  carries 
much  long  traffic,  the  losses  on  that  will  more  than  use 
up  the  profit  on  the  local,  and  keep  them  in  a constant 
state  of  helplessness.  v 

It  may  be  said  that  they  can  get  better  rates  on  the 
long  traffic,  — rates  that  will  be  sure  to  pay  the  expense 
of  carriage.  That  is  not  true,  unless  the  public  will 
pay  more  for  freight,  brought  over  that  line,  than  over 
the  old  route.  However  much  the  rates  may  change, 
from  time  to  time,  on  freight  from  the  West  to  the  sea- 
board, the  same  difference  is  kept  between  the  rates  to 
Boston  and  those  to  Hew  York.  The  former  are  a 
dollar  a ton  higher  on  most  of  the  business,  and  two 
dollars  on  the  lighter  and  some  special  goods.  Cutting 
the  through  line  at  Albany,  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles 
from  Hew  York,  gives  to  the  Albany  and  Boston  road 
the  proportion  which  would  pay  for  transit  on  one  hun- 


36 


dred  and  fifty  miles  of  distance,  if  it  was  going  to  New 
York,  and  the  dollar  or  two  dollars,  as  the  case  may  be, 
extra,  which  is  charged  on  Boston  freight.  The  dollar 
or  two  is  to  pay,  under  the  pro  rata  system,  for  the 
extra  fifty  miles  of  distance  to  Boston  oyer  the  distance 
to  New  York.  Of  course,  if  freight  is  taken  to  New 
York,  on  its  way  to  Boston,  the  rate  due  for  carriage 
to  that  city  is  used  up,  and  nothing  remains  to  pay  for 
its  carriage  to  Boston  but  the  extra  dollar  or  two 
belonging  to  the  Boston  rates.  These  rates  and  condi- 
tions will  be,  as  heretofore,  uniform  on  all  the  routes, 
Pennsylvania  Central,  as  well  as  New  York  lines,  for 
neither  will  let  the  other  underbid  them,  as  frequent 
general  reductions  in  the  rates,  to  less  than  half  the 
cost  of  carriage,  have  shown.  The  rates  to  Boston, 
therefore,  may  be  regarded  as  permanently  not  oyer  a 
dollar  a ton  higher  than  to  New  York,  on  the  great 
bulk  of  the  produce  business,  and  when  the  route  through 
the  Mohawk  valley  chooses  to  make  it  the  same  to 
Boston,  as  they  now  offer  to  do  on  produce  for  export, 
they  can  do  so,  and  still  make  more  money  on  it  than 
any  other  lines  can  to  New  York. 

The  idea  that  the  road  was  likely  to  earn  the  interest 
upon  such  an  enormous  capital  has  obtained  much  of 
its  support  from  the  statements  of  experts,  that  the 
Massachusetts  railroads  earn  an  average  of  eighteen 
thousand  dollars  per  mile.  The  returns  of  the  Massa- 
chusetts railroads  give  the  mileage  of  the  roads,  within 
and  without  the  State  separately.  Their  earnings  they 
do  not  thus  separate,  but  give  their  whole  earnings, 
within  and  without  the  State,  in  one  sum.  Their 
whole  mileage,  and  their  whole  earnings  upon  that 


37 


mileage,  may  be  stated  as  follows  for  the  year 
1869  : — 


Miles  of  main  road  in  the  State, 
“ road  out  of  the  State, 

“ branch  roads, 


Total  miles  per  report, 

Deduct  for  error  in  Cheshire  Railroad, 

Total  miles, 

Gross  earnings  for  the  year, 
which  is  per  mile, 


1241.48 

400.70 

268.47 

1910.65 

53.65 

1857.00 

$24,539,722 

$13,214 


With  that  prudent  foresight  which  intelligent  men 
use  in  spending  their  own  money,  the  Massachusetts 
railroads  have  mainly  been  built  where  they  could  sup- 
ply a great  public  necessity  not  otherwise  provided  for. 
They  have  been  laid  through  the  manufacturing  and 
populous  districts,  on  the  shortest  route,  to  the  nearest 
and  best  market.  With  this  favorable  beginning,  to 
attain  their  present  condition  of  great  prosperity  has 
required  many  years  — almost  a generation  — of  persist- 
ent effort  to  create  and  develop  their  business.  Much 
of  their  success,  in  this  direction,  has  been  due  to  their 
very  small  indebtedness,  and  the  consequent  elasticity 
of  their  finances.  How  is  it,  in  this  respect,  with  the 
Boston,  Hartford,  and  Erie  Railroad?  A very  small 
proportion  of  its  business  is  of  that  steady  and  reliable 
character  for  which  the  Massachusetts  railroads  were 
built.  The  most  valuable  portion  of  its  local  business, 
and  all  of  its  through,  is  better  accommodated  by  other 
lines. 

Their  return  to  the  State  for  the  year  1854  closes  as 
follows : — 


38 


" Since  our  last  return  we  have  completed  and 
" opened  for  travel  that  portion  of  our  road  extending 
"from  Blackstone  to  Mechanicsville,  on  the  Norwich 
"and  Worcester  Railroad  (about  twenty-three  miles), 
" and  by  the  first  of  next  month  we  expect  to  open  for 
" travel  some  twelve  miles  more,  extending  from  Ded- 
" ham,  through  Dorchester,  to  the  foot  of  Summer 
" street,  in  the  city  of  Boston,  thereby  completing  the 
"line  between  Boston  and  the  city  of  New  York.  We 
" also  expect  that  the  remaining  section  of  our  road  to 
"Southbridge  will  be  finished  and  opened  for  travel 
" during  the  next  summer.” 

Since  that  return  its  local  business  in  this  State,  after 
fifteen  years  of  development  (with  some  intermission 
when  the  road  did  not  run),  has  not  increased  to  that 
amount  per  train  per  mile  which  the  other  Massachu- 
setts railroads  expend  in  working  and  keeping  up  their 
roads. 

It  is  not  reasonable  to  expect  that,  if  the  road  is  com- 
pleted through  to  the  North  River,  it  will  at  once  start 
off  with  any  larger  earnings  per  mile  than  did  the  other 
Massachusetts  railroads.  After  from  five  to  twenty-five 
(perhaps  an  average  of  fifteen)  years  of  development, 
the  earnings  of  the  Massachusetts  railroads  had  risen, 
in  1859,  to  an  average  of  six  thousand  eight  hundred 
and  eighty-five  dollars  per  mile.  This,  at  seventy-five 
per  cent,  for  expenses,  leaves  a net  of  one  thousand 
seven  hundred  and  twenty-one  dollars  per  mile,  which, 
on  the  three  hundred  and  sixty-three  miles  of  the  Bos- 
ton, Hartford,  and  Erie  Railroad,  would  be  seven  per 
cent,  on  eight  million  nine  hundred  and  twenty-five 
thousand  dollars. 


39 


After  five  years  of  farther  development,  the  average 
earnings  had  risen,  in  1864,  to  nine  thousand  four  hun- 
dred and  forty-three  dollars  per  mile,  which,  at  the  same 
rate  of  expenses,  would  yield  seven  per  cent,  upon 
twelve  million  four  hundred  and  seventy-two  thousand 
dollars. 

After  five  years  more  of  development,  the  average 
earnings  had  grown,  in  1869,  to  thirteen  thousand  two 
hundred  and  fourteen  dollars  per  mile,  which,  at  the 
same  rate  of  working  expenses,  would  yield  seven  per 
cent,  upon  seventeen  million  two  hundred  and  eighty- 
four  thousand  dollars. 

No  road  which  has  to  compete  for  any  considerable 
proportion  of  its  business  can  be  worked  for  seventy- 
five  per  cent,  of  its  earnings.  The  average  working 
expense  of  the  Massachusetts  railroads  is  above  seventy 
per  cent,  of  their  gross  earnings. 

If  this  road  should  only  do  such  business  as  it  could 
clearly  make  a profit  on,  it  would  be  mainly  confined  to 
a small  local  traffic,  and  probably  would  not  earn  nearly 
so  much  as  the  six  thousand  eight  hundred  and  eighty- 
five  dollars  per  mile  given  above,  but  it  would  be  sure 
to  make  some  profit.  If  it  made  an  effort  to  swell  its 
gross  earnings,  by  doing  much  through  traffic,  its  net 
earnings  would  be  proportionately  reduced. 

What  has  led  to  the  remarkable  estimates  of  the  value 
of  this  road,  entirely  overshadowing  all  the  most  suc- 
cessful railroad  enterprises  in  the  country?  There  is 
nothing  remarkable  about  it  but  its  enormous  waste  and 
misuse  of  money,  and  it  seems  to  be  assumed  that,  be- 
cause many  millions  of  the  Company’s  money  have  been 
lost  in  stock  speculations  and  disappeared  in  various 


40 


ways  without  leaving  any  property  to  represent  it,  some- 
how or  other,  the  value  of  the  property  has  proportion- 
ally increased;  that  a road  honestly  costing,  perhaps, 
fifteen  or  eighteen  million  dollars,  has,  by  the  misuse 
of  its  funds,  come  to  be  worth  forty  million.  Had  this 
road  only  cost  the  average  of  the  other  New  England 
roads,  say  fifteen  million  dollars,  the  idea  that  it  would 
earn  the  interest  on  forty  million  dollars,  or  even 
twenty  million,  I venture  to  suggest,  would  never  have 
occurred  to  its  most  sanguine  friends. 

In  reply  to  a question  of  the  committee,  I stated  that 
I would  not  finish  the  road  for  it,  and  gave,  as  a reason, 
that  I doubted  the  sufficiency  of  their  estimate  of  six 
millions  of  dollars  to  complete  and  equip  the  road. 
Their  estimates  have  not  heretofore  resulted  in  a man- 
ner to  give  confidence  that  the  cost  would  not  be  eighty 
or  even  ten  millions.  In  all  the  sanguine  expressions 
of  its  friends  and  advocates,  I have  not  yet  heard  a 
reason  (unless  a bald  assertion  be  a reason),  why  this 
road  is  likely  to  earn  a satisfactory  income,  upon  its 
probable  cost  of  completion  and  equipment  to  the  North 
River,  more  especially  if  it  has  to  pay  tribute  to  the 
parties,  who,  I understand,  own  and  control  the  ferry 
and  terminal  grounds  at  that  point. 

The  more  I reflect  upon  this  matter  the  more  am  I 
inclined  to  reiterate  my  earlier  conclusions,  that  it  would 
be  very  marked  success  if  they  should  hereafter  make 
on  their  completed  road  a profit  sufficient  to  pay  the 
interest  upon  half  as  much  per  mile  as  the  average  cost 
of  the  rest  of  the  railroads  in  Massachusetts,  which 
would  be  represented  by  a capital  of  eight  million  five 
hundred  and  seventy-three  thousand  five  hundred  dol- 


41 


lars.  Paying  the  interest  on  this  sum  I should  regard 
as  the  outside  measure  of  attainable  profit,  while  the 
chance  of  earning  more  than  enough  to  pay  the  work- 
ing expenses  and  keep  up  the  property  is  quite  uncer- 
tain. 

MOUNTAIN’  AND  VALLEY  ROUTE. 

The  Alleghany  mountains,  and  their  northern  con- 
tinuations, extend  from  the  Mohawk  valley  to  the  Car- 
olinas.  The  Baltimore  and  Ohio,  the  Pennsylvania 
Central  and  Erie  Railroads,  have  vainly  sought  for  a 
passage  through  this  great  barrier.  The  Baltimore 
and  Ohio  crosses  these  mountains  at  a profit,  because 
its  outlet  to  the  sea,  at  Baltimore,  is  two  hundred  and 
twenty-six  miles  nearer  the  West  than  the  port  of  New 
York;  and  that  much  of  land  carriage  is  saved.  The 
Pennsylvania  Central  has  its  outlet  at  Philadelphia, 
about  a hundred  and  forty  miles  farther  West,  and 
nearer  the  sources  of  business  than  the  more  northern 
lines ; and  this  fact  enables  that  line  to  cross  the  moun- 
tains at  a profit.  The  Erie  Railroad  crosses  this  same 
range;  but  New  York  is  so  far  from  the  West  that  this 
road  can  make  no  profit  by  carrying  traffic  from  the 
West,  over  the  mountains,  to  that  city. 

It  lives  upon  its  immense  local  business,  taking  the 
smallest  proportion  of  the  through  traffic,  and  making 
up  its  losses  upon  it  out  of  the  way  business. 

This  formidable  mountain  range  breaks  off  entirely 
at  the  Mohawk  valley,  which  extends  all  the  way  to  the 
lakes.  Through  this  natural  outlet  pour  four-fifths 
of  the  whole  produce  of  the  West,  which  seeks  the  sea- 
board north  of  Pennsylvania,  flowing  directly  towards 
6 


42 


and  in  the  latitude  of  Boston,  until  it  reaches  Albany, 
when  it  makes  a right  angle,  and  flows  one  hundred 
and  fifty  miles  down  to  New  York. 

This  route  from  the  "West  is  so  much  better  than  any 
other,  that  freight  can  be  taken  over  it,  via  Albany  to 
Boston,  at  much  less  cost  than  it  can  be  taken  over 
any  other  route  to  the  city  of  New  York.  In  other 
words,  freight  cannot  be  landed  in  New  York,  by  the 
Pennsylvania  Central  or  Erie  Railroad,  at  as  little 
absolute  cost,  as  it  can  be  landed  in  Boston  by  the 
New  York  Central  and  Albany  and  Boston  Railroads, 
or  any  equally  good  road,  built  through  the  valley  of 
Central  New  York,  and  from  the  North  River  to  Bos- 
ton. 

This  great  current  of  produce  can  be  tapped  at  Al- 
bany, or  Troy,  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles  before  it 
reaches  New  York,  at  much  better  advantage  than  any- 
where else. 

Nothing  can  be  more  foolish  than  to  go  twenty-four 
miles  further,  to  get  to  Fishkill,  and  then  be  ninety-four 
miles  further  from  the  West,  and  still  have  all  the  moun- 
tains between  the  road  and  the  business  it  is  seeking. 
It  is  wholly  unreasonable  to  expect  to  get  cost  for  doing 
business  obtained  in  such  a novel  way. 

The  natural  route  is  on  this  latitude,  and  any 
effort  to  obtain  a more  southerly  one  can  only  result  in 
disappointment  and  loss,  — disappointment,  because  the 
object  sought  cannot  be  obtained,  and  loss,  because  the 
money  used  would  be  absolutely  sunk. 

I expect,  when  the  Iloosac  Tunnel  is  completed,  it 
will  be  a thoroughfare  for  many  railroads ; that,  at  least, 
two  complete  lines  between  Boston  and  the  valley  of 


43 


Central  New  York  will  pass  through  it;  and  that  the 
completion  of  these  shorter  lines,  with  lower  grades,  will 
compel  the  Albany  and  Boston  Railroad  to  straighten 
their  line,  by  which  twelve  or  fifteen  miles  will  be 
saved,  when  Boston  will  have  three  better  and  shorter 
lines  than  the  present  one  to  the  Hudson  River.  Under 
the  influence  of  these  additional  lines,  I expect  the  much- 
talked-of  new  line  through  Central  New  York  will  be 
built  from  the  Hudson  River  to  the  lakes,  which,  with 
the  Albany  and  Susquehanna,  will  make  three  lines 
from  the  West  to  the  Hudson  River,  tributary  to  Bos- 
ton, on  two  of  which  freight  can  be  brought  from  the 
West,  and  landed  in  Boston,  at  less  actual  cost  than,  by 
the  Erie  or  Pennsylvania  Central,  it  can  be  landed  in 
New  York. 

And  during  the  season  of  inland  navigation,  when  the 
Hudson  River  carries  water-borne  freight  so  cheap  to 
New  York,  I expect  vessels  and  steamers  of  eight  or 
nine  hundred  tons,  from  all  the  ports  of  the  upper  lakes, 
will  land  unbroken  cargoes  at  Burlington,  Vermont,  two 
hundred  and  fifty-eight  miles  from  Boston.  But  I do  not 
expect  produce  will  be  carried  from  the  West  toward  the 
seaboard,  until  it  arrives  within  eighty-five  miles  of 
Baltimore  and  one  hundred  and  six  miles  of  Philadel- 
phia, and  then  be  turned  northward,  and  carried  past 
New  York  four  hundred  and  sixteen  miles  to  Boston  for 
export,  in  any  sufficient  quantity  to  exercise  the  least 
influence  upon  the  prosperity  of  Boston  or  the  welfare 
of  Massachusetts. 

Much  of  the  commercial  prosperity  of  New  York  is 
due  to  her  communication  with  the  West  through  the 
Mohawk  valley,  and  it  is  through  this  same  valley,  and 


44 


not  by  more  circuitous  routes  over  mountains,  that  Bos- 
ton must  look  for  such  a connection  with  the  West  as 
will  make  it  practicable  to  recover  and  increase  her  com- 
mercial prosperity. 


COAL  TRAFFIC. 

The  following  paper  was  furnished  to  me  by  a friend 
who  has  experience  in  the  coal  traffic : — 

The  price  paid  for  carrying  coal  over  the  Baltimore 
and  Ohio  Railroad  from  Cumberland  to  Baltimore,  one 
hundred  and  eighty  miles,  through  trains,  on  an  average 
descending  grade  from  the  mountains  to  the  seaboard,  is 
a fraction  under  one  and  one-half  cents  (14  cts.)  per  ton 
per  mile.  For  intermediate  stations  the  rate  is  higher. 

The  prices  over  the  Cumberland  and  Pennsylvania 
Railroad  are  five  (5)  cents  per  ton  per  mile  for  five  (5) 
miles,  and  under  four  (4)  cents  between  five  (5)  and 
ten  (10)  miles,  and  three  (3)  cents  for  distances  over  ten 
(10)  miles.  This  road  is  carried  over  mountain  grades, 
is  fifty-three  (53)  miles  long,  including  branches  and 
sidings. 

There  are  two  important  conditions  affecting  the  cost, 
and  admitting  of  these  moderate  rates  upon  these  two 
roads,  which  cannot  apply  to  any  New  England  rail- 
roads. 

1st.  The  volume  and  regularity  of  the  traffic,  which 
permits  these  two  roads,  as  well  as  the  Reading,  to 
maintain  a complete  and  special  equipment  devoted  to 
and  applicable  for  this  coal  business  alone. 

The  intermittent  business  of  distributing  coal,  in  com- 
paratively small  quantities,  to  towns  and  villages  along 


45 


the  line  of  a railroad,  is  an  entirely  different  traffic,  and 
subject  to  greatly  increased  expenses,  per  ton,  per  mile. 
Any  price  for  such  distribution,  based  upon  the  cost  of 
the  through  coal  traffic  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
or  Beading  roads,  will  be  altogether  unreliable  and  in- 
sufficient. 

2d.  The  minimum  cost  of  coal  consumed  by  the 
locomotives  employed  in  hauling  coal  trains  from  the 
mining  districts,  supplies  the  motive  power  at  the  mini- 
mum cost,  while  New  England  necessarily  pays  the 
maximum  cost  of  fuel.  The  Cumberland  and  Pennsyl- 
vania, and  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Bailroads,  pay  from 
one  dollar  and  twenty-five  cents  to  one  dollar  and 
seventy-five  cents  per  ton;  while  the  roads  leading 
out  of  Boston  pay  for  coal  from  the  same  mines  from 
seven  dollars  and  fifty  cents  to  eight  dollars  per  ton. 

That  volume  and  regularity  of  business  is  essential  to 
maintaining  the  above-mentioned  moderate  rates  is 
proved  by  the  fact  that  even  under  the  rates  charged 
by  the  Cumberland  and  Pennsylvania  Bailroad,  the 
business  is  conducted  at  a loss  during  the  winter  months, 
when  the  tonnage  is  seriously  reduced. 

The  Boston  and  Lowell  Bailroad  charge  five  cents 
per  ton,  per  mile,  for  hauling  coal  twenty-five  miles  to 
Lowell,  over  a straight  road,  with  easy  grades. 

The  prices  necessarily  charged  by  the  New  England 
roads,  for  carrying  and  distributing  coal,  always  have 
been,  and  doubtless  always  will  be,  vastly  higher  than 
those  charged  by  the  great  through  traffic  railroads  of 
Pennsylvania  and  Maryland,  taking  the  coal  down  from 
the  mines  to  the  seaboard,  — all  theories  or  calculations 
to  the,.contrary  notwithstanding. 


43 

If  Massachusetts  invests  her  money  in  Connecticut 
railroads,  upon  the  idea,  thereby,  of  getting  coal  into 
the  old  Bay  State  at  the  prices  per  ton,  per  mile, 
charged  on  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  or  Beading  rail- 
roads, she  will  be  acting  against  the  experience  of  every 
mile  of  railroad  within  her  limits. 


